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Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has struggled to find the
proper level of access to the justice system for the poor. The United States's
commitment to a market economy inevitably results in wealth disparities that
prevent the poor from receiving the same level of access to counsel as the rich.
In trying to resolve the resulting tension between capitalism and equal justice,
the Court has rejected most attempts to remedy the effects of the law on
disadvantaged groups.
As an alternative, the Court has recognized a limited number of
fundamental constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. In some cases, the fundamental rights strand of equal
protection has secured equal access to the justice system for the poor by
waiving filing and transcript fees and by providing counsel. A recent parental
termination case involving a transcript fee waiver was a rare instance in which
the Court explicitly sought to remove poverty as a barrier to justice.
In December 1996, the Court held that Melissa Lumpkin Brooks, an
indigent Mississippi woman, was entitled to a free transcript in order to appeal
the state's decision to take away her two children. The 6-3 decision in M.LB.
v. S.L.J. was based on the fundamental right of access to the criminal process
initially recognized in the 1956 case of Griffin v. Illinois.2 Griffin, relying on
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, held that an indigent criminal
1. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996). M.LB. and S.L.J. are the initials of Melissa Lumpkin Brooks and her former
husband, Sammy Lee James. The Mississippi Supreme Court required the use of their initials to protect the
identities of their minor children. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii. M.LB. (No. 95-853). Brooks.
however, disclosed their identities during interviews with the press. See Joan Biskupic. Justices Give
Indigent Parents Greater Access to Civil Appeals, WASH. POST. Dec. 17. 1996. at A2; LUnda Greenhouse.
Needy Who Lose Parental Rights Gain in Top Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996. at Al; Frank J. Murray.
Mother Who Lost Her Parental Rights Seeks Ruling on Free 'Pauper' Appeal. WASH. TIMEs. Mar. 24.
1996, at A3; Frank J. Murray, Poverty Can't Halt Appeal of Stripped Parental Rights. High Court's Ruling
Removes 'Bolts,' WASH. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at A6; cf. David G. Savage, People's Court Ruling for a
Mother's Rights Puts Human Face on Supreme Court's Work, A.B.A. J.. Mar. 1997. at 40. 40 ("Sometimes
a seemingly minor case can shine a light on the judicial system and reveal much about the workings of the
law: how procedural rules can have a powerful real-life significance, how poverty and justice intersect, how
even a Supreme Court inclined to defer to the states can be aroused to protect fundamental interests.").
2. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
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defendant had the right to a free transcript in order to pursue a direct appeal.'
In providing Brooks with a free transcript, the M.L.B. Court found that parental
termination cases, although technically civil, are "'quasi criminal in nature"' 4
and therefore fall under Griffin's right of access to the criminal process. Thus,
ML.B. can be construed as expanding the fundamental right of access to the
criminal process on behalf of the poor.
The M.L.B. Court's apparent enlargement of a fundamental constitutional
right provoked a vigorous dissent from the Court's more conservative
Justices. Justice Thomas, whose dissent was so strident that Chief Justice
Rehnquist refused to join part of it,6 called for the overruling of the Griffin
line of cases.7 Furthermore, Justice Thomas decried the extension of Griffin's
right of access from criminal to quasi-criminal cases: "Griffin did not merely
invent the free transcript right for criminal appellants; it was also the launching
pad for the discovery of a host of other rights. I fear that the growth of Griffin
in the criminal area may be mirrored in the civil area."8
Although Justice Thomas's "fear" about purely civil cases is important, a
more pressing concern may be the extension of M.L.B. to the state
postconviction appeals of indigent death row inmates such as Georgia's
Exzavious Lee Gibson. In September 1996, Gibson represented himself
involuntarily before a Butts County judge. Gibson, who is borderline mentally
retarded, was too poor to afford an attorney, and Georgia had refused to
appoint him counsel for his state postconviction hearing.9 Gibson's case,
which a law firm subsequently took pro bono, is being appealed."
3. See id. at 19.
4. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 561 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
5. See id. at 570-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined all of Justice Thomas's opinion. See
id.
6. Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to join part 11 of Justice Thomas's opinion, which suggested that
Griffin should be overruled. See id. at 570 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7. Justice Thomas wrote: "If this case squarely presented the question, I would be inclined to vote to
overrule Griffin and its progeny." Id. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 577 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas envisaged fee waivers for indigent civil litigants
embroiled in paternity suits, custody fights, divorce decrees, zoning ordinance challenges, and foreclosure
actions. See id. at 576-77. "In brushing aside the distinction between criminal and civil cases--the
distinction that has constrained Griffin for forty years--the Court has eliminated the last meaningful limit
on the free-floating right to appellate assistance," Justice Thomas wrote. "I have no confidence that the
majority's assurances that the line starts and ends with this case will hold true." Id. at 577-78.
9. For the most complete transcript of Gibson's state habeas hearing, see Ann Woolner, Why Can't
the Condemned Die Without a Fuss?, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 23, 1996, at I, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File [hereinafter Woolner, Condemned]. See also End Death-Rosy Roulette,
USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 1997, at 12A; Bob Herbert, In America; The Hanging Tree, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1997,
at A17; Bill Rankin, When Death Row Inmates Go to Court Without Lawyers in the Late Stages of Their
Fight To Stay Alive, Some Must Represent Themselves, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 29, 1996, at D5; Ann
Woolner, Four Savannah Kids' Fortunes Rise: They Get Some Settlement from Mom's Case, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 21, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter
woolner, Fortunes].
10. An Atlanta law firm, King & Spalding, filed an appeal for a certificate of probable cause on
Gibson's behalf to the Georgia Supreme Court. The appeal is still pending. See Application for Certificate
of Probable Cause to Appeal, Gibson v. Turpin (Ga. May 27, 1997) (No. 95-V-648).
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In recent years, the Court has been reluctant to invoke the fundamental
rights strand of equal protection law to prevent the states from discriminating
against the poor.1 This Note, however, argues that the Court should use
M.LB., the fundamental right of access to the criminal process, and wealth-
based disparate impact theory to shift the current state of equal protection law
so as to provide counsel at state postconviction review for indigent death row
inmates such as Gibson.
Part I argues that by relying on Griffin's fundamental right of access to the
criminal process, M.LB. could revive wealth-based disparate impact theory. It
contends that M.LB. limited the discriminatory purpose or intent requirement
of Washington v. Davis,'2 an equal protection case that has impeded disparate
impact challenges. Based on M.LB., this part argues that the Court should
recognize a fundamental rights exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose
requirement. It asserts that Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal
process, contrary to Justice Thomas's dissent, is still good law and was not
implicitly overruled by Davis.
Part I uses M.LB.'s emphasis on equal protection to argue that indigent
death row inmates such as Gibson should receive appointed counsel at state
postconviction review. If the Court is going to forbid death row prisoners from
filing successive federal habeas petitions, the part argues, the inmates should
have counsel their first time through the capital appellate process. Thus, Murray
v. Giarratano,13 which held that neither the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause nor the Eighth Amendment requires the states to provide death
row inmates with counsel at postconviction proceedings, should be overruled. 4
Part II also demonstrates that state postconviction review of death penalty cases
triggers Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court, therefore, should recognize and apply a
fundamental rights exception in the cases of indigent death row inmates who are
in need of counsel at state postconviction proceedings.
I. M.L.B.: THE REVIVAL OF WEALTH-BASED DISPARATE IMPACr THEORY?
Disparate impact, 5 often referred to as "de facto discrimination,"'' 6 is
an equal protection theory concerned with discriminatory effects or results.
11. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection. 90 MIcH. L REv. 213.
285 (1991) ("[A]pprehension regarding the fundamental rights strand was due not to its constitutionalizing
of unenumerated rights, but rather to its potential for judicial wealth distribution.").
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
14. See id. at 10.
15. Disparate impact is also described in the literature as "disproportionate impact." E.g.. Theodore
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constinttional Adjudication. 52 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 36 (1977).
16. E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1. 21 (1973) (emphasis omitted)
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Unlike disparate treatment, or de jure discrimination, which is concerned with
corrupted policies and processes imbued with discriminatory purpose or intent,
disparate impact analysis focuses on facially neutral laws and practices that
affect some protected groups more than other groups. For example, a facially
neutral standardized test that produces a higher rate of failure among women
than among men has a disparate impact on women. t7 Historically, disparate
impact cases have focused on racial and ethnic groups. In the 1960s and 1970s,
for example, desegregation litigation targeted laws with racially discriminatory
effects.' 8 Today, disparate impact challenges are commonly seen in Title VII
employment discrimination cases.' 9 Recent disparate impact challenges under
equal protection law, however, have failed because Davis's discriminatory
purpose requirement limits the Court's level of scrutiny.
Any equal protection challenge to a state law hinges largely on the
Court's level of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, which has been described as
"strict" in theory but "fatal" in fact,20 requires that a law be narrowly
tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest. To receive strict scrutiny under
equal protection, a law must either involve a suspect classification or
impinge on a fundamental right.2 ' Wealth is not a suspect classification.22
Economic inequality has been redressed by the Court only where it affects
rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 23 The two
most frequently recognized fundamental equal protection rights are the right
to vote and participate in elections 24 and the right of access to the
17. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding the use of a standardized test that
had a disparate impact on blacks who were trying to join the Washington, D.C., police department).
18. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (declaring Tuskeegee, Alabama's
racial gerrymandering to be unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954)
(declaring school segregation unconstitutional). Compare Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971)
(holding that closing the swimming pools in Jackson, Mississippi, to avoid desegregating them was not
unconstitutional), with Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (holding that closing public
schools to avoid desegregation was unconstitutional).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
20. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). The last time
the Court failed to strike down a racial classification under a strict scrutiny standard, it upheld the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War 11, See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
219 (1944).
21. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
22. See, e.g., id. at 28-29 (finding that wealth is not a suspect classification). Suspect classifications
include race, national origin, and alienage. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880) (race); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217 (national origin);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage). Quasi-suspect classifications, which require
heightened, but not strict, scrutiny, include gender and illegitimacy. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (gender); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (illegitimacy);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (illegitimacy).
23. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
24. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (waiving filing fees for indigent candidates who
demonstrate the seriousness of their candidacies); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking
down a Texas system of primary elections requiring exorbitant filing fees); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating a Virginia poll tax because it interfered with the right




If an equal protection case does not involve suspect classes or fundamental
rights, the law in question will be reviewed under a rational basis test. Laws
subject to rationality review require only legitimate state interests and usually
are entitled to a "'strong presumption of validity.'- 26 In general, unintended
wealth-based effects will be ignored; the best chance such effects have of
being redressed is if fundamental rights, like the right to vote or the right of
access to the criminal process, are at stake.
A. Griffin v. Illinois: The Rise of Wealth-Based Disparate Impact Theory
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Warren Court began proscribing
discrimination based on wealth by announcing fundamental equal protection
rights. In Griffin v. Illinois,27 an Illinois law requiring transcripts prevented
two convicted armed robbers from appealing their cases to the state supreme
court. A plurality of the Griffin Court, citing the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses, held that an indigent criminal defendant's direct appeal cannot
be denied because of an inability to afford a transcript.28 The Court said that
although states are not required to provide appellate review, they cannot
"discriminate[] against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty.' 29 Justice Black, writing on behalf of four members of the Court,
declared, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." 3
By justifying his opinion under both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, Justice Black ignited a forty-year controversy over the source of the
right of access to the criminal process. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin,
scheme as racially discriminatory because voting is a fundamental nght).
25. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (plurality opinion) (providing indigent defendants
with free transcripts or their equivalent for first appeals as of right): infra Section I.D. In addition to these
equal protection rights, the Court has recognized a right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618.
634 (1969), a right to procreate, see Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438. 453 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942), and a right to exercise First Amendment freedoms. see Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972). In contrast, the Court has rejected fundamental equal protection
rights to assisted suicide, see Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997). to government employment.
see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976), to education. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35, to housing. see Lindsey v. Normet. 405 U.S. 56. 73-
74 (1972), and to welfare payments, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471. 483-87 (1970).
26. Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312. 319 (1993)). On occasion, the
Court has employed a more rigorous form of rational basis review. See. e.g., Romer v. Evans. 116 S. Ct.
1620, 1627-28 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that forbade any laws
protecting homosexuals from discrimination).
27. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
28. See id. at 18-19.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 19.
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preferred to rely on the Due Process Clause.3' Footnote eleven of Justice
Black's plurality opinion answered Justice Harlan's dissent by explicitly
discussing the disparate impact theory of equal protection: "Dissenting opinions
here argue that the Illinois law should be upheld since by its terms it applies
to rich and poor alike. But a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation."32 Griffin was the first instance in which the
Court redressed the effects of economic inequality through the Equal Protection
Clause. "In criminal trials," Justice Black wrote, "a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or
color."33
Justice Frankfurter provided the fifth vote in Griffin. A firm believer in the
principles of judicial restraint and federalism,' Justice Frankfurter wrote that
"a State need not equalize economic conditions. ' 35 He recognized, however,
that the Court must strike a balance: "[T]he State will neither bolt the door to
equal justice nor support a wasteful abuse of the appellate process." 36
At first, the Court erred on the side of not bolting the door. Seven years
after Griffin, in Douglas v. California,37 the Court reaffirmed Griffin's
reasoning under an equal protection theory. Douglas held that an indigent
criminal not only had the right to a free transcript at direct appeal, but also the
right to counsel because of the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 To the Court's lone dissenter, Justice Clark, Douglas
represented a "fetish for indigency.''39 The majority, viewing the law as a
case of "'discrimination against the indigent, '"4O said counsel represented the
difference between a "meaningless ritual" and a "meaningful appeal." 4'
The Warren Court's concern for the indigent reached new levels when it
tried to make wealth a suspect classification in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections.42 Harper struck down a poll tax of $1.50 on all Virginia residents
over twenty-one as discriminating against the indigent's right to vote, holding
that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause because voting is a
31. Justice Harlan rejected the idea that the "Equal Protection Clause imposes on the States an
affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." Id. at 34
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 17 n.ll (plurality opinion) (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)) (emphasis
added).
33. Id. at 17.
34. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647-48 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (advocating judicial restraint in a flag salute case).
35. Grigin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. Id. at 24.
37. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Douglas was decided the same day as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), which provided a right to counsel for the indigent at all felony trials.
38. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.
39. Id. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 355 (majority opinion) (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion)).
41. Id. at 358.
42. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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fundamental right "'preservative of all rights. ' '4 3 The poll tax in Harper
primarily constituted an effort to deter blacks from voting, yet the Court's
opinion focused on wealth: "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane
to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally
disfavored."" Harper was one of the Warren Court's boldest attempts, in
dicta, to make wealth a suspect classification.4 5 Although the attempt
ultimately failed, 6 Harper established the right to vote, like Griffin's right of
access to the criminal process, as a fundamental equal protection guarantee.
B. The Fall of Wealth-Based Equal Protection
During the 1970s, the Burger Court halted the expansion of fundamental
equal protection rights and thwarted any attempts to declare wealth a suspect
classification. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez4 7 held
that Texas's system of funding public education did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, in part because it did not result in "an absolute deprivation
of the desired benefit." 4 Rodriguez said that wealth is not a suspect
classification 49 and that education is not a fundamental right on a par with the
right to vote or the right of access to the criminal process.5 The Court thus
crippled attempts to proscribe discrimination solely on the basis of wealth.
After Rodriguez, the only hope of redressing the effects of economic
inequality was through existing fundamental equal protection rights.
Washington v. Davis,"' however, curtailed the use of wealth-based disparate
impact theory. Several black applicants to the Washington, D.C., police force
challenged the validity of a standardized test, which they claimed excluded a
disproportionate number of black candidates.52 The Court rejected the
challenge, holding that an equal protection claim required a showing of
43. Id at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
44. Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
45. See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs. 394 U.S. 802- 807 (1969) ("[A) careful
examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, two
factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more
exacting judicial scrutiny." (citation omitted)). Frank Michelman. in his seminal discussion of wealth-based
equal protection, argued that in a market economy, wealth cannot be a suspect classification. Instead, he
espoused a "minimum protection" theory, based on a Rawlsian theory of social justice, which satisfies basic
economic deprivations, or "just wants." Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L REv. 7. 13 (1969).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
48. Id. at 23; cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to a state
education policy in part because it absolutely deprived children of illegal immigrants of an education).
49. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28-29.
50. See id. at 35; see also id at 33 ("It is the not province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.").
51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52. Four times as many blacks failed the test as did whites. See id. at 237.
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discriminatory purpose.53  Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement
impeded the use of the disparate impact theory of equal protection to remedy
the effects of economic inequality.
While the facts of Davis were limited to race-based disparate impact, the
Court also addressed disparate impact based on wealth. Just three years after
Rodriguez, Davis reaffirmed the Court's disapproval of using the Equal
Protection Clause to alleviate wealth disparities. The Davis Court, in dicta,
placed a dual emphasis on race and class. 54 Davis's discriminatory purpose
requirement became the biggest roadblock for wealth-based disparate impact
theory. For the next twenty years, the only debate was the extent of Davis's
reach. There were no successful challenges to Davis-at least not until M.L.B.
C. The Meaning of M.L.B.
M.L.B. addressed the differing interpretations of Washington v. Davis, the
scope of the Griffin line of cases, the choice between equal protection and due
process, and the future of disparate impact analysis as a means of combating
discrimination against the poor. It also gave an indigent Mississippi woman
hope that she would regain the right to be a mother to her two children.
1. The Facts
In 1992, Meredith Lumpkin Brooks and Sammy Lee James were
divorced after nearly eight years of marriage. James retained custody of their
two children, Samuel and Melissa, who were seven and five at the time.55
Less than three months later, James remarried. About a year later, he
petitioned to terminate Brooks's parental rights so his new wife could adopt
the children. In December 1994, a Benton County, Mississippi, chancery
court found "clear and convincing proof' of "substantial erosion" of Brooks's
relationship to her children,56 but "cited no specific evidence to support the
53. As Justice White wrote for the 6-3 majority:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power
of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant,
but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.
Id. at 242.
54. The Davis Court said:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling
justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax,
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the
poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.
Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
55. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 559 (1996).
56. Decree of Adoption H 1, 3, S.LJ. v. M.L.B., No. 93-A-006 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Dec. 14, 1996),
reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 10, M.LB. (No. 95-853).
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decision. 57 Brooks's name was removed from their birth certificates, and
she "was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children.""
Brooks, a twenty-eight-year-old waitress who was making $2.13 an hour
plus tips, 59 filed a timely appeal to the state supreme court and paid the
requisite $100 filing fee. Several days later, a court clerk estimated that the
costs of the transcript fees in her case would be $2,352.36.60 Under
Mississippi law, there is a right to an appeal, but only upon payment of
costs. 6' Unable to afford such fees, Brooks filed a motion for in forma
pauperis status. In August 1995, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied her
request and held that it accepted informa pauperis motions in civil cases only
at the trial level. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 62 heard the case
on October 7, 1996, and on December 16 reversed and remanded the state
supreme court's decision. The Court held that in parental termination cases
indigent defendants cannot be denied appellate review because of an inability
to afford transcripts.63 What remains undetermined, besides Brooks's right to
her children, 64 is the impact of the Court's justification for its decision under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
2. The Holding: Equal Protection and Due Process
M.LB. "reflect[s] both equal protection and due process concerns" 5
because Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process is
inextricably linked to both clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66 According
to M.L.B., due process is concerned with "the essential fairness of the
state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action"; equal protection is
based on "the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on
their inability to pay core costs.
67
M.LB. relied more heavily on equal protection because "'[m]ost decisions
in this area,' we have recognized, 'res[t] on an equal protection
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3.
58. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
59. See Savage, supra note 1, at 40.
60. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4.
61. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-29 (1972 & Supp. 1997).
62. The ACLU of Mississippi paid the filing fees for Brooks's petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8 n.2.
63. See M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 559 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago. 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971)).
64. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Brooks in forma pauperis status and is still considering
the merits of her appeal. Telephone Interview with Danny Lampley. Cooperating Attorney. ACLU of
Mississippi (Jan. 26, 1998). Brooks is now a waitress in Memphis. See Biskupic. supra note I.
65. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
66. See id. ("[Iln the Court's Griffin-line cases, '[d]ue process and equal protection pnnciples
converge."' (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660. 665 (1983))).
67. Id.
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framework.' '68 M.LB.'s holding is based primarily on Mayer v. City of
Chicago,69 an equal protection case. In Mayer, a student could not afford the
transcript fees to challenge two petty criminal offenses. Mayer held that
Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process-specifically the
provision of free transcripts or their equivalent-does not depend on the threat
of incarceration.7° M.LB. analogized Brooks's parental termination case to the
petty criminal offenses in Mayer. The Court agreed with the petitioner's claim
that a mother's losing her children is "barely distinguishable from criminal
condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence of the loss she
faces.",7 1 By labeling M.LB. "'quasi criminal in nature,"' the Court was able
to fit it under Griffin's right of access to the criminal process.72
Justice Kennedy wrote a two-paragraph concurrence suggesting that the
cases "most on point" should be seen as "resting exclusively upon the Due
Process Clause. '73 He analogized M.LB. to cases "addressing procedures
involving the rights and privileges inherent in family and personal relations"
74
and suggested the decision should be based on Mathews v. Eldridge's due
process balancing test.75 The M.LB. Court cited several due process cases,
including Boddie v. Connecticut,76 which held that states could not deny
indigents divorces because of the inability to pay court fees.77 It also relied
on two previous parental termination cases based on due process.78
68. Id. (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665). The Bearden Court held that the state could not
automatically revoke a defendant's probation for failing to pay a fine and make restitution. See Bearden,
461 U.S. at 661-62. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, however, ultimately agreed with Justice Harlan's
argument in Griffin and focused on due process. See id. at 666 & n.8.
69. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
70. See id. at 197 ("The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures arm
made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be
imposed.").
71. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 565. In M.L.B., the Court considered (1) "the character and intensity of the
individual interest at stake"; and (2) "the State's justification for its exaction." Id. at 566 (citing Bearden,
461 U.S. at 666-67).
72. Id. at 568 (quoting Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196).
73. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring). One M.L.B. commentator suggested that Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), involved an "access-plus" standard, in which the fundamental right of
access, plus an additional fundamental right such as marriage, triggers heightened scrutiny. See The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, Ill HARV. L.REv. 197, 251-52 (1997). The commentator,
however, did not rule out an interpretation based strictly on equal protection, but criticized a dual equal
protection-due process rationale. See id. at 256-57.
74. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. See id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); see also The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Leading Cases, supra note 73, at 256 n.63 (suggesting the M.L.B. Court actually conducted an
Eldridge balancing of the private interests, public interests, and risk of error); cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976) (criticizing the Eldridge test for
ignoring alternative value theories such as individual dignity, equality, and tradition or evolution).
76. 401 U.S. 371 (1971), cited in M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562.
77. See id at 380-81.
78. The M.LB. Court relied on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982), which held that
"clear and convincing" proof is required in parental termination cases; and Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981), which held that the appointment of counsel in parental termination
cases is at the discretion of the trial court. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 557, 564.
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Although Justice Kennedy's concurrence relied more heavily on due
process, it cannot be the primary source of the Court's opinion for several
reasons. First, due process concerns for the indigent are limited in civil cases.
The Court has refused to extend Boddie to include bankruptcy actions" or
judicial review of welfare benefits,8° and it has limited the state's obligation
to provide counsel in parental termination cases."t The M.LB. Court
recognized that, under due process, "fee requirements ordinarily are examined
only for rationality. The State's need for revenue to offset costs, in the main
run of cases, satisfies the rationality requirement."'
Second, due process does not require the state to provide appellate
review.83 Although the M.LB. majority disagreed with Justice Thomas's
complete rejection of due process," it shared his belief that the
Griffin-Douglas line of cases is "best understood as grounded in equal
protection analysis. 85 The key to M.LB was not only the fairness of the
state's judicial process, but also the denial of Brooks's fundamental right of
access to the criminal process because of her indigency. While due process is
invariably a component of Griffin's right of access, equal protection is at least
as important, if not more so. Justice Thomas, however, ultimately rejected the
M.LB. Court's equal protection theory because of his desire to overrule Griffin
and his overexpansive understanding of Washington v. Davis.
3. The Fundamental Rights Exception to Washington v. Davis
The future of disparate impact theory is essentially a fight over the scope
of the discriminatory purpose requirement of Davis. Discriminatory purpose
has been defined as "impl[ying] that the decisionmaker ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.8'  A case about
racial discrimination in public employment, Davis provided an alternative to
the statutory disparate impact theory of employment discrimination presented
79. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).
80. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973).
81. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
82. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567 (citation omitted).
83. See id. at 560; id. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting), see also Johnson v. Fankcll. 117 . Ct. 1800,
1807 n.13 (1997) ("We have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each State to decide how to structure
its judicial system." (citing M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 561)); McKane v. Durston. 153 U.S. 684. 687 (1894)
(holding that appellate review of a criminal case is not required by due process, but is up to the discretion
of the states).
84. Justice Thomas rejected a due process argument because the petitioner received notice and a
hearing before a judge, her attorney confronted the evidence and witnesses against her at tral. and the
judge decided the case under a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. See M L.B.. 117 S. Ct. at 572
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 571; accord id. at 566 (majority opinion).
86. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 87 In Griggs, the Court struck down the
company's requirement of a high school diploma as not job-related and as
discriminating against black employees seeking to move from the company's
labor department into higher-paying jobs in other departments. The Griggs
Court held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not require a
showing of discriminatory purpose. It embraced disparate impact theory by
prohibiting "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 8
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion declared that "practices, procedures,
or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."89 The holding in Griggs was limited to Title VII
employment discrimination "on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification. ' 90
The Davis Court distinguished its holding from Griggs by asserting that
Title VII did not apply to the Davis petitioners. Furthermore, Davis separated
Title VII from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, requiring
a showing of discriminatory purpose in cases based on the latter. Davis did not
overrule Griggs, although the Court has subsequently tried to do so.9' Neither
Griggs nor Davis discussed anything other than racial discrimination in
employment.
The discriminatory purpose requirement, although hotly debated by
scholars,92 has been applied in a number of contexts. Disparate impact
87. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
88. Id. at 431.
89. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 431.
91. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (rejecting disparate impact
analysis in a Title VII case). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)), was passed in part as a response to Wards Cove.
92. Scholars have come down on both sides of the debate. My work relies heavily on the ideas of
Professor Owen Fiss, who has advocated the use of disparate impact theory through group-based equal
protection rights. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
146 (1976) ("The concern with the result reveals to me that what is ultimately at issue is the welfare of
certain disadvantaged groups .... ) [hereinafter Fiss, Groups]; Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564, 593 & n.50 (1965) (suggesting that
Griffin holds that disparate racial impact violates the Equal Protection Clause). For criticisms of the
discriminatory purpose (or intent) requirement, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16-20 (2d ed. 1988); Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration. 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 397; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993); Charles
R. Lawrence IIJ, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997); and David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935 (1989). For defenses of the discriminatory Intent
requirement, see Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95; and John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970). For proposals of equal protection doctrines that partially
incorporate an intent requirement, see Eisenberg, supra note 15, which develops an equal protection theory
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challenges have failed in attacks on alleged gender-based discrimination in
public employment, 93 alleged racial discrimination in zoning,9 and alleged
racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty." Davis
became the rule in equal protection cases: Disparate impact, without disparate
treatment, does not trigger a constitutional violation.
When the discriminatory purpose requirement was applied in a Fifteenth
Amendment case, however, Justice Marshall argued that Davis had been
extended too far. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,% a plurality of the Court held
that Mobile's electoral system did not violate the rights of the city's black
voters and required a showing of racially discriminatory purpose to prove a
violation of the Fifteenth as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.7 In dissent,
Justice Marshall objected to the plurality's holding that ."[o]nly if there is
purposeful discrimination ... can there be a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 9' Justice Marshall said such an
interpretation of Davis was "plainly overbroad" and that "[it fails to
distinguish between two distinct lines of equal protection decisions: those
involving suspect classifications, and those involving fundamental rights."
Justice Marshall argued that discriminatory purpose is not required to
trigger strict scrutiny if fundamental equal protection rights are at stake. Justice
Marshall said the discriminatory purpose requirement did not apply to the
"fundamental right to equal electoral participation that encompasses vote
dilution. 't° Therefore, Justice Marshall asserted, Bolden was controlled not
by Davis but by a vote-dilution case, White v. Register,'0 ' which was decided
three years before Davis and did not require a showing of discriminatory
purpose. 0 2 Justice Marshall thus attempted to create a fundamental rights
based on both disparate impact and disparate treatment: and Paul Brest. The Supreme Court. 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Prnciple. 90 HARV. L REV. I (1976). which
advocates an antidiscrimination principle prohibiting both intentional discrimination and unintentonal race-
dependent decisionmaking.
93. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
94. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.. 429 U.S 252 (1977).
95. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). For cncitcsm of McCleskey. see Randall L
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court. 101 HARV. L REV.
1388 (1988).
96. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
97. See id at 61.
98. Id. at 112-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 66 (plurality opinion)). Justice Stevens.
concurring in Bolden, explicitly rejected the idea that the discriminatory purpose requirement should be
extended to Fifteenth Amendment cases. See id. at 83. 85 (Stevens. J.. concurrng).
99. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 114.
101. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
102. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 119-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Subsequent cases appear to suggest the
existence of a fundamental rights exception, at least for voting, where discriminatory intent could be
inferred from strong showings of disparate impact. See Hunter v. Underwood. 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (striking
down an Alabama constitutional provision's disenfranchisement of people for cnmes of moral turpitude
such as vagrancy and passing bad checks by relying on historical proof of the law's targeting of black
voters); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (upholding the finding of purposeful discrimination in an
at-large voting district in a rural Georgia county based on facts similar to those in Bolden). This exception,
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exception to the discriminatory purpose requirement.
Although the Bolden plurality chose not to embrace Justice Marshall's
fundamental rights exception, the Court 0 3 and commentators"°  have
recognized variations on Justice Marshall's theme. For example, Professor
Daniel Ortiz has argued that Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement is
stronger in housing and employment cases than in cases of jury selection,
voting, and education. "Intent takes into account not only the invidiousness of
the government's classification but also the importance of the individual
interests at stake," Ortiz writes, describing the fundamental rights exception as
a "hierarchy" of rights. 5 Justice Marshall fleshed out this hierarchy in a
footnote to his Bolden dissent, listing the Court's decisions that recognized
other fundamental rights unaffected by Davis.1r6 Among them were Griffin
and Douglas's "right to fair access to criminal process."' "re
Sidestepping Davis was the key to the Court's decision in M.L.B. The
respondents in M.L.B. contended that Davis's discriminatory purpose
requirement applied to this case: "This must be all the more true with respect
to an allegedly disparate impact on a class that, unlike race, is not suspect.
This Court has specifically held that the poor are not a suspect class."'
08
Under Justice Marshall's conception of Davis, however, it was irrelevent that
wealth is not a suspect classification. As a case about the fundamental right of
access, M.L.B. did not require a showing of discriminatory purpose. In effect,
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion can be read as accepting Justice Marshall's
view and rejecting the respondents' arguments. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the
majority that Davis "does not have the sweeping effect respondents attribute
to it."' 9 To prove this, Justice Ginsburg cited a disparate impact case
upholding the right of access to the criminal process that Justice Marshall had
asserted was beyond the pale of Davis."0
The M.L.B. Court held that the case was not controlled by Davis, but by
Williams v. Illinois."' In Williams, the state forced an indigent prisoner
however, has not been extended to other fundamental rights. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(rejecting a statistical study as proof of purposeful racial discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty). Rogers and Justice Marshall's dissent in Bolden raise the question whether the requirement of
purposeful discrimination should be less strict for group rights than for individual rights, See GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITTIONAL LAW 710 n.l (12th ed. 1991). For a discussion of group-based equal protection
rights, see Fiss, Groups, supra note 92.
103. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) ("Only a pedant would insist that there are no
meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States ... ").
104. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 11, at 289 n.349; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1140 (1989) (suggesting that the discriminatory purpose requirement
is stronger in areas "relegated primarily to market control, like housing and employment").
105. Ortiz, supra note 104, at 1137.
106. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 113 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Brief for Respondents at 31, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853).
109. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 569.
110. See id. (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970)).
111. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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serving a one-year sentence for petty theft to remain in jail beyond the
maximum term in order to work off $505 in fines and court costs at a rate of
$5 per day." 2 The Williams Court, on equal protection grounds, struck down
the Illinois statute and held that prisoners could not be incarcerated beyond
their maximum terms because of their indigency. A difficulty in using Williams
to support M.LB. is that Williams was decided six years before Davis. Despite
this seeming anomaly, Williams is not bad law. Indeed, Justice Thomas, who
alertly observed that Williams preceded Davis,"3 did not insist that Williams
had been overruled." 4 Furthermore, Justice Scalia, who joined Justice
Thomas's M.LB. dissent, used Williams in a punitive damages case to
exemplify constitutional equal protection jurisprudence. "5
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in M.LB. could rely on Williams in
part because of the latter case's ambiguity. Chief Justice Burger, who wrote
the majority opinion in Williams, also authored the Griggs Court's oft-quoted
definition of disparate impact theory as "fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."" 6 Yet, as the author of Williams three months later, Chief Justice
Burger conflated disparate impact and disparate treatment. In the first
paragraph of the Williams opinion, Chief Justice Burger described the claim
as one of "discriminatory treatment."" 7 He referred to disparate treatment
again at the beginning of his discussion of Griffin and its progeny."' Then,
two paragraphs later, he eschewed disparate treatment in favor of disparate
impact." 9 He oddly introduced Williams as a case about disparate treatment,
yet justified the Court's holding with a discussion of disparate impact.
Justice Ginsburg's M.LB. opinion seized on the confusing language of
Williams. In a cryptic paragraph, she carved out an exception to Davis by
seemingly collapsing the categories of disparate treatment and disparate impact:
Sanctions of the Williams genre, like the Mississippi prescription here
at issue, are not merely disproportionate in impact. Rather, they are
wholly contingent on one's ability to pay, and thus "visi[t] different
112. See id. at 236.
113. See M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. See id. ("[To the extent its reasoning survives Davis, I think that Willhams is distnguishable.-).
115. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 38 (1991) (Scalia. J.. concumng). Justice
Scalia refused to "call [Williams's constitutionality] into question." Id.
116. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
117. Williams, 399 U.S. at 236.
118. See id. at 241.
119. The Court wrote:
On its face the statute extends to all defendants an apparently equal opportunity for limiting
confinement to the statutory maximum simply by satisfying a money judgment. In fact. this is
an illusory choice .... By making the maximum confinement contingent upon one's ability to
pay, the State has visited different consequences on two categories of persons since the result
is to make incarceration in excess of the statutory maximum applicable only to those without
the requisite resources to satisfy the money portion of the judgment.
Id. at 242.
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consequences on two categories of persons"; they apply to all
indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class. 2 '
The phrase "not merely disproportionate in impact" does not allow disparate
treatment to obviate the theory of disparate impact. Justice Ginsburg, like the
petitioner's brief, t2' equated the two theories. Sometimes, in particularly
invidious cases, disparate impact looks like disparate treatment.' 22 In M.L.B.,
the Mississippi transcript fee requirement absolutely deprived indigent mothers
of any opportunity to appeal parental termination decisions. The M.L.B. Court
was concerned with laws that "apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone
outside that class."'t23 Granted, all financial requirements impose some sort
of hardship on the poor. M.L.B., however, stands for the proposition that
absolute deprivation cannot be tolerated when fundamental rights are at stake.
Although the M.L.B. opinion is ambiguous, the Court should use it to
recognize a fundamental rights exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose
requirement. According to Justice Marshall's Bolden dissent, Williams survived
Davis because it was based on Griffin's fundamental right of access to the
criminal process. Hence, Williams and M.L.B. are united by their attention to
this fundamental right. Although decided six years before Davis, Williams's
protection of the fundamental right of access to the criminal process allowed
M.L.B. to make an end-run around Davis.
The Court should recognize a fundamental rights exception because of the
government's monopoly power over the right of access to the criminal
process. 24 Boddie v. Connecticutt"5 represented the limit of the Court's
concern about how wealth disparities affect "[t]he legitimacy of the State's
120. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 569 (1996) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Williams, 399 U.S. at 242).
121. The petitioner said in her brief:
Mississippi could not, consistent with the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, limit the
right of appeal to, for instance, parents who possess assets worth over $200,000, or whose
annual income exceeds over $50,000 a year, and leave everyone else to the reason, the mercy,
or the whim of a single trial judge. By excluding the petitioner from her appeal, and refusing
even to consider her contention that she cannot afford the $2,000 plus price that the State court
system is charging for the appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court is doing much the same thing.
Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, M.LB. (No. 95-853).
122. For example, in Eick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court struck down a San Francisco
ordinance refusing to give licenses to laundries in wooden buildings. The stone building requirement
affected more than 200 Chinese laundries and only one non-Chinese laundry. Yick Wo was a disparate
impact case that smacked of disparate treatment. See also supra note 102 (discussing voting cases in which
the Court found disparate impact rose to the level of disparate treatment).
123. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 569.
124. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 267, 287 (advocating a distinction between "state coercion and
monopolization" and affirmative governmental assistance); infra note 230 and accompanying text. But see
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Cr. Rov.
41, 58-59 (criticizing the fundamental rights strand of equal protection).
125. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
[Vol. 107: 22112226
1998] Right to Counsel 2227
monopoly over techniques of final dispute settlement."'' Although Boddie
is a due process case that has since been limited to divorce actions,12 7 M.LB.
said access to the political and judicial processes are "exceptions"'t2' to the
rule that "States are not forced by the Constitution to adjust all tolls to account
for 'disparity in material circumstances." ' ' 29 The M.LB. Court distinguished
an "'affirmative right to governmental aid '''130 from "a State's destruction
of... family bonds."''
31
The right of access to the criminal process and the right to vote may not
be the most treasured rights in the minds of most Americans, 32 and they are
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.' 33 These two fundamental equal
protection rights, however, are essential to American ideas about democratic
self-government. ' They protect what the famous Carolene Products
footnote described as the political processes relied on by "discrete and insular
minorities. ' 13' The Court has recognized that, for a prisoner, "the right to file
a court action might be said to be his remaining most 'fundamental political
right ... preservative of all rights.""136 The government's monopoly power
over the right to vote and Griffin's right of access to the criminal process
126. Id. at 375-76; see id. at 376 ("For at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective
means of resolving the dispute at hand and denial of a defendant's full access to that process raises grave
problems for its legitimacy."); see also Klarman, supra note II, at 267 ("Thus while the state compels
defendants' participation in the criminal justice system and monopolizes meaningful exercise of the
franchise, it exerts no equivalent control over food, housing or medical care.").
127. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
128. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 568.
129. ld. at 567 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 23 (1956) (Frankfurter. J . concurng)). The
M.LB. Court recognized two "exceptions" to rationality review: "'Te basic right to participate in political
processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license. Nor may access
to judicial processes in cases criminal or 'quasi criminal in nature' turn on ability to pay " Id at 568
(quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971) (citations omitted)).
130. Id. at 568 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.. 489 U.S 189. 196
(1989)); see also Klarman, supra note 11. at 289-90 ("The unpalatable aspect of fundamental nghts equal
protection, in other words, was not its recognition of unenumuerated rights, but its reconccptualization of
equal protection as an entitlement to affirmative governmental assistance."); The Supreme Court. 1996
Term-Leading Cases, supra note 73, at 254-55 & n.57.
131. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 568; see id. ("Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to
be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action.").
132. See Klarman, supra note II, at 267 ("Only a lawyer, after all, could argue with a straight face
that legal assistance in a criminal appeal is more important than, for example, food and shelter.").
133. The right to vote is not guaranteed anywhere in the Constitution. Only the right not to be
discriminated against in voting is guaranteed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 n.78 (1973) (stating that "the right to vote, per se. is not a constitutionally
protected right").
134. One M.LB. commentator noted:
[E]qual Protection alone provides principled support for requiring a wiver of appellate costs
for indigents; if getting to court is truly "fundamental" to a democratic system-more like
voting rights than the amorphous set of "fundamental" interests cognizable under substantive
due process-then this interest alone should support a right of equal access.
The Supreme Court, 1996-Leading Cases, supra note 73. at 257 (citing TRIBE, supra note 92. § 16-12.
at 1463) (footnote omitted).
135. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144. 152 n.4 (1938).
136. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886)).
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obviate the need for Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement because these
rights represent the political voices of the people.
D. Griffin's Fundamental Right of Access to the Criminal Process
Justice Thomas's dissent ignored the government's monopoly power over
these fundamental rights by calling for the overruling of Griffin and its
progeny. Justice Thomas has claimed Griffin and Douglas were overruled by
Davis: "The Davis Court was motivated in no small part by the potentially
radical implications of the Griffin/Douglas rationale."' 37 Although there is
no denying that Rodriguez and Davis dealt a dual blow to wealth-based equal
protection, the Davis Court said nothing of Griffin and Douglas. The Davis
Court's references to wealth could be interpreted as dicta, for there is only one
oft-quoted reference to discrimination against "the poor" and the fear of
widespread economic-based implications.' 38 Justice Thomas, however, used
Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement as a catch-all.
The Court has legitimated Griffin's fundamental right of access to the
criminal process both before and since Davis. Although there was no
fundamental rights strand of equal protection when Griffin was decided in
1956, cases extending the Griffin line during the 1960s acknowledged that the
right of access to the criminal process is fundamental. 39 Even Ross v.
Moffitt,t40 which limited the Griffin line of cases by holding that states were
not required to provide counsel at discretionary appeals, acknowledged the
valid principle in Griffin that "a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights
for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent
persons."' 4' Although Ross limited Griffin two years before Davis, several
post-Davis cases have recognized Griffin's fundamental right of access, 42
and one case, Bounds v. Smith, 43 has even expanded it.
The Bounds Court extended Griffin's right of access to the criminal
process by emphasizing a right to "'[m]eaningful access."' "44 The Court held
137. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2192 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
138. See supra note 54.
139. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) ("This Court has never held that the States
are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these
avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the
courts." (emphasis added)), quoted in M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555, 561 (1996); see also Long v.
District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (per curiam) (describing the Court's holding in Griffin as a
"fundamental principle").
140. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
141. Id. at 607. In M.LB., the Court pointed out that six of the seven Justices in the Davis majority
had the opportunity to overrule Griffin in Ross but instead upheld it. See M..B., 117 S. Ct. at 569 n.16.
142. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404 (1985) (describing Griffin as protecting a "vital"
right); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1983) (relying on "Griffin's principle of 'equal justice"),
quoted in M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 569.
143. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
144. Id. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 610, 611, 615 (1974)).
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that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts" mandated
meaningful access to adequate prison law libraries or qualified legal
assistance. 45 The existence of Bounds is the real source of Justice Thomas's
ire. Justice Thomas believes Bounds, like Griffin and Douglas, should be
overruled.' 46 He principally expressed this belief in another 1996 case, Lewis
v. Casey.14 7 In Lewis, the Court rejected a challenge to the Arizona prison
library facilities, requiring proof of "actual injury."' 48 Lewis limited Bounds,
but did not overrule it. Obviously, the Court did not go far enough in Lewis
for Justice Thomas: "Bounds was wrongly decided .... [T]he equal protection
theory underlying Griffin and its progeny had largely been abandoned prior to
Bounds."'' 49 Justice Thomas incorrectly equated Davis's evisceration of
disparate impact theory as it relates to suspect classes with the overruling of
forty years of the Court's precedents about fundamental constitutional
rights. 50 M.LB., however, suggests that Griffin's fundamental right of access
to the criminal process remains good law and that disparate impact theory is
not dead.
For the first time in twenty years, a majority of the Court has limited
Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement. In doing so, M.LB. has
reinvigorated the equal protection rationale undergirding the Griffin-Douglas
line of cases. Despite the murkiness of the M.LB. Court's reasoning, the Court
should use it to recognize a fundamental rights exception to Davis's
discriminatory purpose requirement. The fundamental rights exception has the
potential to reestablish disparate impact theory as a means of combating the
effects of wealth discrimination. How disparate impact theory will apply to
other cases depends on several factors: (1) whether the Court explicitly
recognizes a fundamental rights exception to Davis; (2) how far the Court is
willing to extend the fundamental right of access to the criminal process; and
(3) to what extent the Griffin-Douglas-Bounds line of cases remains good law.
These are the issues the Court must confront if disparate impact theory is to
become a viable legal argument for redressing wealth-based
discrimination-not just for parental termination cases, but for the criminal
justice system as well.
145. Id. at 828.
146. See M.L..B., 117 S. Ct. at 572 (Thomas. J. dissenting) ("As I stated last Term in Lnvis v. Casey.
I do not think that the equal protection theory underlying the Griffin line of cases remains viable. There.
I expressed serious reservations as to the continuing vitality of Bounds %, Smith." (citations omitted)).
147. 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (1996) (Thomas, J.. concurring).
148. Id. at 2180 (majority opinion).
149. Id. at 2190-91 (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. See id at 2191. Justice Thomas wrote: "In the years between Douglas and Bounds... we
rejected a disparate impact theory of the Equal Protection Clause.... IThe doctrinal basis for Grifin and
its progeny has largely been undermined." Id.
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II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CAPITAL STATE POSTCONVICTION REVIEW
If the Court recognizes a fundamental rights exception to Davis's
discriminatory purpose requirement, Griffin's fundamental right of access to
the criminal process could trigger strict scrutiny of state laws that fail to
provide indigent death row inmates with counsel at state postconviction
proceedings. This part argues that the Court, because it has limited successive
federal habeas petitions, should ensure that death row inmates have counsel the
first time through the process. It then contends that Murray v. Giarratano, 5'
which failed to find a due process or Eighth Amendment right to counsel at
capital state postconviction proceedings, should be overruled. Finally, it asserts
that state postconviction hearings, like parental termination cases, are quasi-
criminal and therefore should be protected under Griffin's fundamental right
of access to the criminal process.
A. The Court's First-Shot Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Last year, the execution rate in the United States reached a forty-year
high.' 52 The Court and Congress have helped the states accelerate the death
penalty appeals process by limiting the number of successive federal habeas
petitions. 53 The Court's philosophy essentially is that the capital appellate
process is a one-shot deal. A convicted death row inmate gets one shot at each
phase of the nine-step process that Professor Anthony Amsterdam has referred
to as the "assembly line.' t 4
The assembly line is breaking down at state postconviction review, among
other places, 55 because some states refuse to provide indigent death row
151. 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
152. In 1997, 74 people were executed (half of the executions were in Texas), compared to 65 people
in 1957. See Bob Herbert, Death Penalty Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1998, at Al l.
153. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1222 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2262 (West Supp. 1998)); Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333,
2340 (1996) (upholding the section of the AEDPA that limits successive habeas petitions); McClcskey v.
Zant. 499 U.S. 467, 489-96 (1991) (clamping down on "abuse[s] of the writ" in second or successive
petitions).
154. Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, HUM.
RTS., winter 1987, at 14, 50. Amsterdam writes:
Capital criminal procedure is a long assembly line, with a long succession of inspectors. The
assemblers at the front of the line commonly do a very poor job of assembly, and the inspectors
at the front of the line all too often do an equally poor job of inspecting, with the result that
later inspectors must repeatedly shunt products off the line, or return them to earlier points for
reassembly.
Id. Justice Harry Blackmun has referred to this process as the "machinery of death." Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The nine-part process is as
follows: (1) trial; (2) direct appeal; (3) appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari; (4) state habeas
hearing; (5) state habeas appeal; (6) appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari; (7) federal habeas
hearing; (8) federal habeas appeal; and (9) appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.
155. Arguably, the biggest problem for indigents accused of capital crimes is incompetent counsel at
trial. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
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inmates with counsel. 56 Instead of rectifying the problem, the Court's most
recent capital punishment jurisprudence has resorted to constitutional overkill.
The Court has made it abundantly clear that successive federal habeas petitions
will be rejected, 157 yet it continues to grant certiorari in death penalty cases
in which an inmate is seeking a second shot.'55 Instead, the Court should
focus on making the first shot count. Indigent death row inmates should be
able to go through the entire appellate process one time with some minimum
level of attorney competence and funding.' 59 As part of this first-shot
jurisprudence, the Court should reconsider Murray iv Giarratano through the
post-M.L.B. lens of equal protection and carve out a right to counsel at capital
state postconviction review.
B. Murray v. Giarratano
In 1989, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that death row inmates
have no right to counsel at state postconviction proceedings, either under the
Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'tf The Equal Protection Clause received only cursory attention
because of the discriminatory purpose requirement.' 6 ' The respondents used
equal protection to plead in the alternative. 62 Likewise, an equal protection
argument was not given much consideration by scholars 161 or by the
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
156. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 153.
158. See, e.g., Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart. 66 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Oct. 14. 1997) (No. 97-300).
granting cert. to 118 F.3d 625 (9th Cir.) (concerning whether the AEDPA prevents a death row inmate
from filing a second federal habeas petition to address his mental competency to be executed). Thompson
v. Calderon, 66 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1997) (No. 97-215). granting cert. to 120 F3d 1045 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (deciding whether, after a first federal habeas petition is final, a federal court of
appeals can vote to rehear a case). But cf. Lonchar v. Thomas. 116 S. Ct. 1293. 1301 (1996) (holding that
a death row inmate's first federal habeas petition must be heard on the merits even if it is filed at the
"eleventh hour").
159. This definition of equality is based on Professor Frank Michelman's ideas about "just wants" and
"minimum protection." Michelman, supra note 45, at 13.
160. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. I, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion).
161. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting. just two years before Giarratano, a
race-based challenge to the death penalty as lacking a showing of discriminatory purpose): Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
162. See Brief for Respondents at 45, Giarratano (No. 88411). The brief argued:
In the Courts below, Plaintiffs consistently argued that the Eighth Amendment. the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the
Suspension Clause of Article I all require a state to provide Death Row inmates with lawyers
to represent them in state postconviction proceedings. Although neither the district court nor the
Fourth Circuit addressed these grounds, each provides an independent basis for affirming the
judgment below.
Id. (citations omitted).
163. Several scholars, however, called for a combined due process-equal protection argument. See
Michael A. Mello, Is There a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel in Capital Post-Conviction
Proceedings?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065 (1989) (describing the right to counsel as a "complex"
right rooted in the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Michael Millemann. Capital Post-
Conviction Petitioners' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles.
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Giarratano Court. 64 In light of M.L.B., Giarratano is due for an equal
protection reexamination.
1. The Holding
In 1985, Joseph M. Giarratano, a Virginia prisoner sentenced to death,
filed a civil rights lawsuit on behalf of death row inmates who could not afford
attorneys to represent them at state postconviction hearings. This class action
suit was prompted by Giarratano's efforts to find a lawyer for Earl
Washington, Jr., an indigent and mentally retarded inmate who was scheduled
to be executed.' 65 Washington had not exhausted his postconviction remedies
because the state had denied his request for an attorney. Under Virginia law,
the judge had the discretion not to appoint counsel for capital state
postconviction review unless the inmate could make a showing of "non-
frivolous claims."' 66 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Virginia law on several grounds.
One lesson from Giarratano is that the right to counsel is not as extensive
as the right of access to the criminal process. 67 The Giarratano Court
rejected the lower court's argument that the right of meaningful access found
in Bounds v. Smith 68 controlled the case. 69 The Court said Giarratano
was controlled instead by Pennsylvania v. Finley,17 0 a noncapital case in
which the Court held that the state was not required to have postconviction
review at all, much less provide counsel.'17  The Giarratano Court refused
48 MD. L. REv. 455 (1989) (advocating a consolidated equal protection-due process liberty interest but
relying more heavily on due process).
164. The Court's holding did not address equal protection: "We therefore decline to read either the
Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause to require yet another distinction between the rights of
capital case defendants and those in noncapital cases." Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10. It did, however, reject
Bounds's equal protection right of meaningful access. See id. at 7.
165. Giarratano, who later published an essay in the Yale Law Journal, see Joseph M. Giarratano, "To
the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been Wrong": Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment,
100 YALE L.J. 1005 (1991), was acting as a pro se attorney. See Colman McCarthy, Cons Teach Cons
Peace; Inmate Joseph Giarratano, a Non-Violence Advocate, PROGRESSIVE, July 1997, at 23. Both
Giarratano and Washington eventually received counsel and had their death sentences commuted to life in
prison. Giarratano has taught other prisoners about alternatives to violence in courses that garnered media
attention but annoyed prison officials, who transferred him to prisons in Utah and Illinois. See Id.
166. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Giarratano (No. 88-411). This requirement was a catch-22 for mentally
retarded petitioners such as Washington, who lacked the mental capacity to state a non-frivolous claim
without counsel.
167. Cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 562 (1996) ("In contrast to the 'flat prohibition' of 'boltcd
doors' that the Griffin line of cases securely established, the right to counsel at state expense, as delineated
in our decisions, is less encompassing.").
168. 430 U.S. 817 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 144-145.
169. See Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 6-7.
170. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
171. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Giarratano plurality: "In Finley we ruled that neither the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the equal protection guarantee of 'meaningful
access' required the State to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction relief." 492
U.S. at 7.
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to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases, rejecting the respondents'
arguments that the states were required to provide counsel because of the
Eighth Amendment's "'evolving standards of decency""' and the need for
accuracy in capital cases under the Due Process Clause.
7 3
2. The Importance of State Postconviction Review
State postconviction review is the autopsy of a capital trial. The median
state postconviction case requires about 600 hours of legal work.' 74 It is the
first opportunity to pursue claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel and
the last opportunity to investigate fact-intensive claims such as actual
innocence and prosecutorial misconduct.
Since Giarratano was decided eight years ago, the importance of providing
counsel for capital state postconviction proceedings has increased. First,
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
of 1996,175 which erects a number of procedural barriers to federal habeas
review. In addition to banning successive federal habeas petitions, the AEDPA
places an unprecedented statute of limitations on filing petitions and eliminates
the federal courts' de novo standard of review.7 6 The Act also attempts to
induce the states to provide counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings
by offering an even shorter statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions if
the states "opt-in. '' 7 No federal court has found that a state has complied
by providing adequate levels of funding and counsel.1 8
Second, Congress eliminated funding for the Postconviction Defender
Organizations (PCDOs) that have represented indigent capital inmates at state
172. Id. at 8 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
173. See id. at 10.
174. A 1987 American Bar Association survey found lawyers spending over 600 hours on state
postconviction proceedings, more than double the amount of time spent on any other pan of the appellate
process. See Brief of the American Bar Association at 34. Giarratano (No. 88-411); Richard J. Wilson &
Robert L. Spangenberg, State Post-Conviction Representation of Defendants Sentenced to Death. 72
JUDICATURE 331, 336 (1989).
175. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266 (West Supp. 1998)).
176. See id. § 107(a), 110 Stat. at 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2264). Under the new standard of
review, any facts or claims not preserved in a death row inmate's state habeas petition will be procedurally
barred at the federal level.
177. Congress will halve the statute of limitations from 360 to 180 days if the states provide counsel
at capital postconviction hearings. See id. § 107(a), I10 Stat. at 1221, 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A 99
2261, 2263).
178. See, e.g., Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (enjoining Florida from
asserting in any state or federal proceeding that it has complied with the opt-in requirements). Compare
Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the district court's finding that California
has not yet complied with the opt-in provisions), with Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1997)
(overruling the lower court's decision that the state had not complied, but only on procedural grounds). See
generally Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Stante. 44 BUFF. L REv. 381. 395 n.45
(1996) (predicting that the incentives would fail and be the focus of litigation).
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postconviction proceedings.179 In McFarland v. Scott, 80 the Court affirmed
that indigent death row inmates have a right to counsel at federal habeas
hearings,'' but, without counsel at the state level, their constitutional claims
will not be preserved for federal review. Federal courts currently find errors
in over forty percent't 2 of all capital cases; at one time errors were found in
over seventy percent.1
8 3
Finally, in February 1997 the American Bar Association (ABA) responded
to these changes by calling for a moratorium on the death penalty until the
situation improves.'" Like the ABA resolution, this Note takes no position
on the morality of the death penalty. Given that capital punishment is a reality,
however, this Note argues that the Court needs to give death row inmates a
meaningful first show by reconsidering Giarratano in the context of M.L.B.
and the proposed fundamental rights exception.
Any challenge to Giarratano faces a formidable series of precedents. 5
The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, however, provides a ray of hope.
As the critical fifth vote, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but
refused to join the Giarratano Court's plurality opinion, writing separately to
convey his ambivalence. Justice Kennedy recognized the importance of
providing counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings:
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part
of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death .... [A]
substantial proportion of those prisoners succeed in having their death
179. About 20 PCDOs lost congressional funding as of September 30, 1996. Some PCDOs have
closed, and some have subsisted through state funding and by cutting back on their staffs. See generally
Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial of the
Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 863 (1996).
180. 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
181. In 1988, Congress extended the right to counsel to indigent death row inmates seeking federal
habeas review. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001 (b), 102 Stat. 4181,4393-94
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1994)). The Court held that the right to counsel begins before a
formal federal habeas petition is filed and that the request for counsel is grounds for a stay of execution.
See McFarland, 512 U.S. at 854-58; cf. Steven M. Latino, Note, Reversing Twenty Years of Supreme Court
Postconviction Jurisprudence: Enlarging the Indigent Capital Defendant's Right to Postconviction Counsel
in McFarland v. Scott, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 327, 358-59 (1996) (questioning
the Court's decision).
182. From 1976 to 1991, death row inmates secured relief in 47% of habeas cases. Only a small
percentage of noncapital inmates receive habeas relief. See Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is There
Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 526 (1996); see also Randall Coyne & Lyn
Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association's Recommendations and
Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POvERTY 3, 25 (1996) (placing the percentage of constitutional errors at 46%).
183. From 1976 to 1983, federal appellate courts discovered constitutional errors in 73.2% of habeas
petitions submitted by capital defendants, compared to only 6.5% of non capital habeas appeals. Out of 41
cases from 1976 to 1983, the federal appellate courts found constitutional errors in 30. See Amsterdam,
supra note 154, at 51; Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death
Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513, 527 (1988).
184. See Bar Association Leaders Urge Moratorium on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at
A20.
185. See supra Subsection II.B. .
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sentences vacated in habeas corpus proceedings. The complexity of
our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital
defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief
without the assistance of a person learned in the law.t 6
Justice Kennedy, however, wrote that providing counsel was not up to the
Court. He agreed with Justice O'Connor to defer to "state legislators and
prison administrators" to maintain Bounds's right of meaningful access.'"
He also expected the ABA, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and
Congress "to give the matter [of counsel at state postconviction] serious
consideration."' 88 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy found no constitutional
violations in Giarratano because there was no actual injury: "While Virginia
has not adopted procedures for securing representation that are as far reaching
and effective as those available in other States, no prisoner on death row in
Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction
proceedings."'89 The case of Exzavious Lee Gibson, however, is the proof
of injury that could change Justice Kennedy's mind.
C. The Case of Exzavious Lee Gibson
Twenty-four years old, indigent, and with an I.Q. of seventy-six, Gibson
was the "first capital habeas petitioner in any state in the modem era of the
death penalty to be forced to proceed without counsel at his habeas evidentiary
hearing."' 9 Gibson was sentenced to death for robbing and killing a sixty-
nine-year-old grocer.'9" The Georgia Supreme Court denied Gibson's direct
appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.', "
Gibson's state postconviction review received national media attention.'93
On September 24, 1996, two weeks before a Mississippi attorney presented
Melissa Lumpkin Brooks's oral argument before the Supreme Court,"
Gibson was all alone at his state postconviction hearing at the Jackson State
Prison. Paige Reese Whitaker, an assistant state's attorney, represented the




189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 2. Gibson v. Turpin (Butts County
Sup. Ct., Ga. May 27, 1997) (No. 95-V-648).
191. Gibson allegedly stabbed the man 39 times. A woman who had seen Gibson running from the
scene led police to his home. A trail of fresh blood led to Gibson's room. where police found him cowering
in the closet. It came out at trial and at Gibson's state habeas heanng that Gibson's mother had been
murdered, his father was absent, and the aunt who raised Gibson had abused him. See Woolner
Condemned, supra note 9.
192. See Gibson v. State, 404 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. 1991), cert. denied. 502 U.S. 1101. and reh g denied,
503 U.S. 999 (1992).
193. See sources cited supra note 9.
194. See Transcript of Oral Argument, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853).
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State of Georgia. Because the state refused to appoint him counsel, Gibson
represented himself. On several occasions, Butts County Superior Court Judge
Carlisle Overstreet asked Gibson if he had any evidence to introduce. Gibson
variously replied, "I don't know what to plead," "I don't have an attorney,"
and "I am not waiving my rights."' 95 Elizabeth Wells, a Georgia Appellate
and Educational Resource Center attorney who was standing in the gallery,
asked the judge for more time so her organization could represent him. The
judge denied Wells's request but said she could sit at the counsel's table with
Gibson. Wells, who said she had not read the trial record, balked at What she
called "an empty offer."' 196 The hearing continued. Gibson did not introduce
any evidence. He asked no questions of his trial counsel, his only witness.'
Georgia is one of two death penalty states that do not provide their capital
defendants with counsel at state postconviction hearings. 98 That does not
mean Gibson's case was an isolated problem.' 99 In the thirty-six other death-
penalty states, counsel is appointed only upon request or erratically at the
discretion of the judge or the public defender.2°° In many cases, the
appointment of counsel makes no practical difference, because states provide
insufficient funds for attorney's fees and reimbursement expenses. For
195. Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 8, Gibson (No. 95-V-648).
196. Rankin, supra note 9; see id. ("'.We don't think that the system benefits by having this inmate
go through without counsel,' Wells said. 'We think that it makes a mockery of the system .... Mr. Gibson
may as well be hung up from a tree out back."'). Wells was removed from the courtroom for her outbursts.
See Woolner, Condemned, supra note 9.
197. See Herbert, supra note 9. Gibson filed a skeletal, pro se habeas petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. The petition was the idea of Wells's Georgia Resource Center in order to toll
the statue of limitations before several new state habeas laws took effect. See Application for Certificate
of Probable Cause to Appeal at 3, Gibson (No. 95-V-648). The Georgia Resource Center, citing the loss
of congressional funding, said it could not represent Gibson because it had cut back its lawyers from eight
to two. See Woolner, Condemned, supra note 9. Whitaker, the state's attorney, claimed that Wells had set
up Gibson as a test case in order to challenge Georgia's policy. At the end of the hearing, Judge Overstrect
asked Whitaker if there was anything Gibson should be instructed on before the hearing was adjourned.
Whitaker said: "I think Mr. Gibson should be aware that this is his first habeas corpus proceeding, and that
if he chooses to file another one, anything that he doesn't raise in this one is going to probably be found
to be waived under Georgia law." Id. In March, Judge Overstreet signed a 49-page order written entirely
by the state that rejected Gibson's request for counsel. See Application for Certificate of Probable Cause
to Appeal at 12, Gibson (No. 95-V-648).
198. See THE SPANGEN13ERG GROUP, AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES IN STATE POST-CONVICTION DEATH PENALTY CASES 20-21, 80
(A.B.A. Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project, 1996) (hereinafter A.B.A. POSTCONVICTION
PROJEcr]. The other, Wyoming, currently has no one on death row. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CR.,
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (1997). In Georgia, the state supreme court has held that no right
to counsel exists at any state habeas hearing. See Hopkins v. Hopper, 215 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Ga. 1975).
Georgia's failure to provide counsel at capital state postconviction has been challenged before. In 1978,
a federal judge ruled that Georgia had violated Bounds's right of meaningful access, but the Fifth Circuit
refused to decide the case until the state supreme court had ruled on the issue. See Gibson v. Jackson, 443
F. Supp. 239, 248-50 (Ga. 1977), vacated, 578 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1978). (The death row inmate in that
case bore no relation to Exzavious Gibson.)
199. See, e.g., Case Highlights Death Row Debate, FLA. TIMES UNION, Aug. 29, 1997, at B I
(recounting the case of 'Tmothy Don Carr, a Georgia death row inmate who could not afford counsel and
missed the deadline for his direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court),
200. See A.B.A. POSTCONVICTION PROJECT, supra note 198, at 81-83.
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example, in Mississippi, there is no right to counsel, but a combined total of
$2000 is allotted for attorney's fees at the trial, direct review, and
postconviction phases. 20' By the time a capital defendant gets to the
postconviction stage, there is almost certainly no money left for attorney's fees
and expenses.m Furthermore, the Mississippi PCDO has closed because of
the loss of federal funding.0 3 Efforts in the Mississippi state legislature to
provide mandatory counsel have been defeated three years running.20
Gibson's case is an appropriate symbol and a point of departure from
which to make a wealth-based disparate impact argument for overruling
Murray v. Giarratano. Although the weight of the Giarratano precedent is
heavy, M.LB., decided three months after Gibson's hearing, provides a
possible lever with which to overturn it.
D. Applying M.L.B.
This section argues that the Court should recognize a fundamental rights
exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement and apply M.LB.'s
equal protection analysis to the right to counsel at capital state postconviction
proceedings. The Court probably would have to fit the right to counsel under
Griffin's right of access to the criminal process. In 1989, the Giarratano Court
rejected the analogy to Bounds's right of meaningful access that provided
access to prison law libraries or equivalent legal assistance. In reconsidering
Giarratano, therefore, emphasis cannot be placed solely on Bounds. Gibson's
right of access would need to rest on other cases.
201. See id at 38.
202. The most common claim by death row inmates is ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. which
is impossible to make without a new lawyer at postconviction. Gibson's new lawyers arc arguing that
because state habeas review was the first time he could litigate ineffective assistance, Gibson should have
been provided with counsel. See Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 33-34. Gibson
(No. 95-V--648); cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (holding that since there is no right
to counsel at state habeas review, there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-83 (1986) (refusing to limit habeas review of ineffective assistance)-
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984) (establishing performance and prejudice prongs to
prove ineffective assistance).
203. See A.B.A. POSTCONVICTION PROJECT. supro note 198. at 39.
204. See id. A Washington, D.C.. law firm has filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging
Mississippi's failure to provide counsel. See Complaint. Russell v. Puckett. No. 97cv596WS (S.D. Miss.
filed Aug. 21, 1997); Marcia Coyle, A Lawyer for Every Death Plea?. NAT'L LJ.. Sept. I. 1997. at Al.
In that case, which concerns a mentally retarded man convicted in 1990 of killing of prison guard, the
petitioners have argued that Mississippi's death row inmates are mentally incapable of representing
themselves. The petitioners' pro bono lawyers, Jenner & Block's Washington office, conducted a study with
the Southern Poverty Law Center of Mississippi's death row population that concluded that the average I.Q.
of Mississippi death-row inmates is 81, two points above borderline mental retardation. See Russell. No.
97cv596WS, at 12-15.
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1. Lewis v. Casey and Actual Injury
The most recent precedent favoring Exzavious Gibson's right of access is
Lewis v. Casey.2 5 Although Lewis limited Bounds by rejecting a challenge
to Arizona prison library facilities, it would help Gibson's case by requiring
"actual injury."206 The Lewis Court's actual injury requirement is consistent
with the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence regarding the postconviction
right to counsel, mirroring Justice Kennedy's concerns in Giarratano that "no
prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to
represent him in postconviction proceedings.
Gibson's case satisfies the actual injury requirement. Gibson was the first
death row inmate in Georgia to have a state postconviction hearing without the
requested benefit of counsel, and the Court has recognized the importance of
208
counsel at postconviction. Without a successful appeal, Gibson's legal
claims have been procedurally barred at the federal level because he failed to
preserve them at the state level by calling witnesses, raising constitutional
errors, and adding to the factual record. Thus, Gibson effectively waived any
chance of having meaningful federal habeas review of his case.2°
2. Williams v. Illinois
The Court could rely on M.L.B.'s muddled analysis of Williams v.
Illinois.21t In both Williams and Gibson, the states discriminated against the
indigent as a class of people. In Williams, indigency prevented inmates from
paying fines and forced them to serve terms beyond the statutory maximum.
In cases such as Gibson's, the lack of counsel prevents inmates from
exercising their state and federal postconviction remedies. If it is indeed the
case that about ninety-nine percent of death row inmates are indigent,21
Georgia is discriminating against nearly all of its death row inmates. By
making its postconviction proceedings "wholly contingent on one's ability to
205. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
206. Id. at 2180. Justice Scalia wrote for the Lewis Court: "Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds
is concerned, 'meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone,' and the inmate therefore must go one step
further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977)).
207. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. I, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
208. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855-56 (1994) (quoting Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 14
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
209. See supra note 197.
210. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
211. That figure is based on a mid-1980s ABA study. See Mello, supra note 183, at 516; cf. Ronald
J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death
Penalty, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 59, 70 (1989) ("It has been estimated that approximately ninety percent of
those on death row could not afford to hire a lawyer when they were tried.").
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pay,s21 2 Georgia is treating its death row inmates in the same way that the
Court objected to in Williams and M.L.B.
3. Ex Parte Hull and Griffin
Two other pre-Bounds cases also buttress Gibson's argument: Griffin v.
Illinois2 3 and Ex parte Hull.214 In Ex parte Hull, a state prison's
"screening process" prevented inmates from filing federal habeas and civil
rights lawsuits. The Hull Court held that there was a right to physical access
and that the screening of federal petitions was forbidden.1 Yet, by not
providing counsel, Georgia is effectively screening which death row inmates
may seek federal habeas review based on their indigency. Justice Souter's
separate opinion in Lewis recognized that "the need for some form of legal
assistance is even more obvious now than it was then, because the restrictions
developed since Bounds have created a 'substantial risk' that prisoners
proceeding without legal assistance will never be able to obtain review of the
merits of their claims. 216 With his habeas remedies severely limited by
Congress and the right to counsel nonexistent in Georgia, Gibson is, in effect,
physically barred from obtaining a meaningful federal review of his case.
Consistent with its holding in M.L.B., the Court should rely principally on
Griffin. The M.L.B. Court pointed out that Griffn's fundamental right of access
to the criminal process is still good law. 217 Even Justice Thomas has
recognized Bounds's potent combination of Hull and Griffin: "By detaching
Griffin's right to equal access and Ex parte Hull's right to physical access
from the reasoning on which each of these rights was based, the Bounds Court
created a virtually limitless right. '2 8 Griffin and M.L.B. are limited in their
application to Gibson's case, however, in that Griffin's right of access usually
applies only to criminal cases.
E. Labeling State Postconviction Quasi-Criminal
To fit Gibson's case under Griffin's fundamental right of access to the
criminal process, state postconviction review must be labeled quasi-criminal.
Capital postconviction hearings are considered civil because they are initiated
by the inmate, not by the state. In Giarratano, Justice O'Connor refused to
212. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555, 569 (1996).
213. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
214. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
215. See id. at 549.
216. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2205 (1996) (Souter, J.. concurring in part. dissenting in part.
and concurring in the judgment).
217. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
218. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2195 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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provide relief in part because there is no right to counsel in civil cases.219
There is also no right to access in civil cases. In the past, Griffin's right of
access has applied mostly to criminal cases.220 M.LB., however, bridged the
civil-criminal gap that bothered Justice O'Connor by quoting Mayer v. City of
Chicago and extending Griffin's right of access to cases "quasi criminal in
nature."' 2t M.LB. held that Brooks's parental termination case was quasi-
criminal because it was "barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation in
view of the magnitude and permanence of the loss she faces. ' 2
If the magnitude and permanence of the loss is the primary criterion, then
a death row inmate's postconviction hearing similarly should be labeled quasi-
criminal. In McFarland v. Scott,' the Court upheld congressional legislation
providing counsel at federal habeas because it reflected "a determination that
quality legal representation is necessary in capital habeas proceedings in light
of 'the seriousness of the possible penalty and ... the unique and complex
nature of the litigation.' ' 4 Labeling death penalty appeals civil obfuscates
the life and liberty interests at stake. Gibson's case is as much as or even more
like a criminal case than the parental termination case in M.L.B. The threat of
the loss of life should enable capital postconviction appeals to be labeled
quasi-criminal and fall under the Griffin-Mayer-M.LB. line of cases.
Another factor in labeling postconviction proceedings quasi-criminal is the
risk of error. In M.LB., the petitioners pointed out that, of the eight appellate
challenges to parental termination decisions in Mississippi from 1980 to 1996,
the state supreme court reversed three. That 37.5% risk of error was a
factor in the Court's decision to provide Brooks with a free transcript.
Similarly, federal courts continue to find constitutional violations in 47% of
capital cases; at one time, the number was as high as 73%.226
Disregarding the magnitude and permanence of the harm and risk of error,
Justice Thomas's M.L.B. dissent ignores the effect of the government's
monopoly power on the individual interests at stake. The logic for Justice
Thomas is very simple: If the state is not required to have appeals, then it
219. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("IThere is nothing
in the Constitution or the precedents of this Court that requires that a State provide counsel in
postconviction proceedings. A postconviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process itself, but is
instead a civil action designed to overturn a presumptively valid criminal judgment."); see also Fay v. Noin,
372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963) (recognizing postconviction review as civil in nature).
220. See supra text accompanying note 8.
221. M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 561 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
222. Id. at 565.
223. 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
224. Id. at 855 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(7) (1994)).
225. See M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 560 n.3.
226. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text. According to the Death Penalty Information
Center, 21 death row prisoners were exonerated by the courts between 1993 and 1997, and there have been
69 wrongful convictions of people sentenced to death since 1973. See David E. Rovella, Danger of
Executing the Innocent on the Rise, NAT'L .J., Aug. 4, 1997, at A7.
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should not be required to pay for them. 27 Justice Thomas effectively
borrowed Justice Harlan's analogy about the difference between excluding
indigents from a free state university (disparate treatment) and forcing them to
pay tuition (disparate impact).2 The difference, however, is that the state
is not forcing anyone to seek an education at a state university.
Thomas's dissent also overlooks the government's monopoly on access to
the judicial and political processes. 229 The Court has distinguished between
the effect of a governmental monopoly and an affirmative right to
governmental assistance. 2-0 This monopoly extends to the states'
administration of capital punishment. Gibson's capital postconviction hearing
was not his choice. Georgia imposed the ultimate sentence of death, and
Gibson had no alternatives besides the state's judicial process. The
governmental monopoly over the judicial process makes it imperative that the
Court recognize a fundamental rights exception and provide a right to counsel
at capital state postconviction review based on Griffin's right of access.
F Hurdles to Federal Intervention
1. History, Transcript Fees, and the Right to Counsel
Recent history suggests that the right of access is broader for transcript
fees than it is for the right to counsel. Ross v. Moffitt 2 ' limited the right to
counsel to first appeals as of right, refusing to extend it to discretionary
appeals.232 The Court again refused to find a general right to counsel for
noncapital postconviction cases in Pennsylvania v. FinleyY 3 and it relied on
227. Justice Thomas wrote:
I see no principled difference between a facially neutral rule that serves in some cases to
prevent persons from availing themselves of state employment, or a state-funded education. or
a state-funded abortion--each of which the State may. but is not required to, provide-and a
facially neutral rule that prevents a person from taking an appeal that is available only because
the State chooses to provide it.
M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan. J.. dissenting). Justice Harlan
wrote:
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is more easily satisfied by
the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it that no one would dispute the constitutional
power of the State to levy a uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates
for the purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine for criminal
violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories of offenses.
Id.
229. See supra text accompanying note 124.
230. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). the Court refused to force states to fund nontherapeutic
abortions, but the Court distinguished abortion cases based on personal choice, from those involving
Grffin's right of access to the criminal process, which implicates "a governmental monopoly in which
participation is compelled." Id. at 471 n.6.
231. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
232. See id. at 610.
233. 481 U.S. 551 (1987); see aLso supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
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Finley rather than Bounds as the controlling case in Giarratano. Giarratano,
meanwhile, firmly established that the right to counsel is not as extensive as
the right to transcript fees under the right of meaningful access.
2M
The history of the right to counsel before Gideon v. Wainwright,235
however, demonstrates that the Court believed capital cases to be different, and
to implicate greater concerns, than other types of cases. Over thirty years
before Gideon, the Court reversed the death sentences of the Scottsboro Boys,
seven young black men accused of raping two white women, because the state
failed to appoint them counsel until the morning of the trial. z 6 In Griffin,
Justice Frankfurter wrote that "a State need not equalize economic conditions.
A man of means may be able to afford the retention of an expensive, able
counsel not within reach of a poor man's purse. ' 237 Justice Frankfurter,
however, assumed a different tone when discussing death sentences: "Since
capital offenses are sui generis, a State may take account of the irrevocability
of death by allowing appeals in capital cases and not in others." 23 Although
absolute equality is not required, denying Gibson counsel at state
postconviction proceedings is an "absolute deprivation ' 239 of his right of
access to the criminal process.
2. Due Process Versus Equal Protection Fundamental Rights
There are two reasons that the Court should find a right to counsel at
capital state postconviction proceedings under the Equal Protection Clause, but
not under the Due Process Clause. Due process rights alleviating the effects of
wealth discrimination are even more limited than equal protection rights.24
Part of the reason, Justice Scalia has suggested, is that fundamental equal
protection rights are "counterhistorical,, 24 not as deeply rooted in history,
234. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (plurality opinion).
235. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
236. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). The Court said:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or
the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at
such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case.
Id.
237. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
238. Id. at 21.
239. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i, 23 (1973) (refusing to strike down
property-tax funding of public schools because the system did not result in an absolute deprivation of public
education).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
241. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The Equal Protection Clause and other provisions of the Constitution, unlike the Due Process
Clause, are not an explicit invocation of the 'law of the land,' and might be thought to have some
counterhistorical content."). Justice Scalia's explanation supported Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970),
one of M.LB.'s principal precedents.
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tradition, and precedent as due process rights. The Court242 and scholars24 3
have echoed Justice Scalia's counterhistorical claim.
Our constitutional standards confirm that the Due Process Clause is more
wedded than the Equal Protection Clause to history and tradition. A
fundamental due process right not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
must be (1) "'so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' that "'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed'"; 21 or (2) "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 245 By contrast, equal protection
fundamental rights must be "explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution." 246 These implicit protections have enabled equal protection to
adapt to our changing ideas about race relations, the right to vote, the right to
travel, and the right of access to the criminal justice system. It also can adapt
to our changing ideas about the death penalty appeals process.24
7
The Court is also more likely to find a fundamental right under equal
protection than due process because equal protection assuages the Court's
concerns about stare decisis.245 In recent years, the Court has been more
willing to ignore stare decisis in cases involving equal protection 219 than in
cases involving substantive due process. 50 The Court's recent stare decisis
jurisprudence seems to confirm Justice Scalia's notions about equal protection
being more counterhistorical than due process.
242. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). the Court declared:
Mhe Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In
determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue
of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of what
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
243. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein. Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationsup
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161. 1163 (1988) ("From its inception.
the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices
against short-run departures .... The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been understood as an
attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply cngrmed and
longstanding.").
244. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut. 302 US. 319.
325, 326 (1937)).
245. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
246. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973).
247. Cass Sunstein suggests that the fundamental nghts strand of equal protection is meant to tugger
strict scrutiny "where politically weak groups are at risk." Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Die. 106 YALE
L. 1123, 1155 (1997). This idea echoes the Carolene Products footnote that calls for heightened scrutiny
in protecting political processes relied on by "discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
248. To provide counsel at state postconviction proceedings, the Court would have to overrule Murray
v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), and limit Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
But McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849. 858 (1994), upheld the right to counsel at capital federal habeas
review and could be interpreted as the appropriate precedent to follow in light of the recent habeas reforms.
249. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-32 (1995) (overruling an equal
protection case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
250. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (holding that stare decisis requires
reaffirming abortion rights set forth in Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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3. Federalism Concerns
Equal protection fundamental rights also trigger fewer federalism
concerns.25t Under an equal protection rationale, the Court would not be
telling the states to abandon either capital punishment or state postconviction
review. Instead, the Court would be forbidding states from erecting procedures
that jeopardize the fundamental rights of the poor. In M.L.B., the Court
considered two main factors in applying equal protection analysis: (1) "the
character and intensity of the individual interest at stake"; and (2) "the State's
justification for its exaction. ' 'as2  Concerning the effect of wealth
discrimination, most states can satisfy rationality review because they have a
legitimate interest in reducing the financial burden on their residents. This is
why it is so important that the state law in Gibson's case "impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." 3
The fundamental right enables the Court to limit Davis's discriminatory
purpose requirement, apply strict scrutiny, and more easily overcome any
federalism concerns.
The Rehnquist Court is extremely concerned with issues of federalism.'
Forcing Mississippi to provide free transcripts in parental termination cases is
a small financial intrusion on state power. On the other hand, telling all thirty-
six capital punishment states that they have to provide counsel at state
postconviction proceedings for all indigent death row inmates is tantamount to
acting like a "super-legislature. '
255
Three additional explanations, however, may mollify the Court's potential
federalism concerns. First, forcing the states to provide counsel may actually
decrease rather than increase federal intrusion on state power.a2 6 If death row
inmates have counsel at state postconviction review, there will be fewer
251. See Sunstein, supra note 247, at 1155. Sunstein writes:
Perhaps the idea is that the fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine is less
intrusive than substantive due process because it leaves states more room to maneuver by
permitting them to invade the relevant right so long as they do so on a nondiscriminatory basis.
This is not entirely implausible ....
Id
252. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666-67
(1983) (stating the importance of examining both the individual interest at stake as well as the legislative
purpose).
253. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down a federal law under
the Commerce Clause for the first time in over 50 years). In the past, the Rehnquist Court has deferred to
Congress and the state legislatures on the issue of counsel at capital state postconviction review. Congress
has failed to nudge the state legislatures into action. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
255. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); accord Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
256. This was one of the arguments devised by Clarence Earl Gideon's appointed counsel, Abe Fortas,
and Fortas's then-summer associate, John Hart Ely. See ANTHONY LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 123-24
(1964) (discussing Ely's argument that "an absolute requirement of counsel might be less of an
intrusion ... because it would be clear-cut"). Gideon's case convinced a unanimous Court to declare that
the states must provide counsel at felony trials. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
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successive federal habeas petitions because the inmates will have received
every opportunity to pursue their claims. Thus, the federal courts can return
death penalty cases to the states in a speedier fashion. This is true both as a
practical matter and as a statutory matter, because congressional habeas
reforms have shortened the statutes of limitations on federal habeas petitions
if the states provide counsel at postconviction review. 7 Second, the federal
government could provide indigents with counsel at capital state postconviction
proceedings. The same counsel appointed with congressional funding at federal
habeas review258 could assist indigent inmates at state habeas review.
Although this would undoubtedly place a greater burden on the federal budget,
it would increase the efficiency of the capital postconviction process by having
the same lawyer at state and federal habeas proceedings. Finally, the Court
should cast aside its federalism concerns when it comes to the death penalty
because the Court traditionally has taken a hands-on approach in shaping this
country's approach to capital punishment.
G. First-Shot Jurisprudence Revisited
The most disappointing aspect of the Giarratano Court's opinion was its
refusal to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases. 5 9 Since 1976, the
Court has been the architect of this country's death penalty assembly line.W
The Court's legitimacy as the arbiter of countermajoritarian rights is at stake
when it ignores the impact of its recent death penalty jurisprudence.' If the
Court intends to help Congress and the state legislatures accelerate the
appellate process by limiting successive federal habeas petitions, it should
ensure indigent death row inmates that the first shot counts.
The Court ought to build on its two recent pieces of first-shot
jurisprudence. In McFarland v. Scott,2 2 the Court upheld the right of death
row inmates to obtain congressionally funded counsel, not only for their initial
federal habeas hearings, but also in drafting their initial federal habeas
petitions.26' In Lonchar v. Thonas, ' the Court held that an original
federal habeas petition cannot be denied even if it is submitted at the "eleventh
257. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 181.
259. The Court had to do this in order to rely on Pennsylvania it Finley. 481 U.S. 551 (1987). See
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Ve therefore decline to read either the
Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause to require yet another distinction between the nghts of
capital case defendants and those in noncapital cases.").
260. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reinstating capital punishment).
261. For a discussion of the countermajoritarian dilemma facing the Court. see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPRFIE COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 240-43 (1966).
which predicted that the Court would eventually declare capital punishment unconstitutional.
262. 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
263. Specifically, the Court held that the right to counsel precedes the filing of a federal habeas
petition and that invoking the fight can trigger a stay of execution. See id. at 856-57.
264. 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996).
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hour., 265 The Lonchar Court held that the states' interests in finality were
outweighed by the inmate's individual rights: "Dismissal of a first federal
habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the
petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an
important interest in human liberty."266 The important interests in human
liberty at stake in McFarland and Lonchar-and the right to a meaningful
initial federal habeas petition-are at stake in Gibson's case as well.
III. CONCLUSION
Thus far, the courts have been reluctant to apply wealth-based disparate
impact theory to the criminal context.267 The newly minted precedent,
however, still has potential to remedy the effects of economic inequality.
M.L.B. extended Griffin's right of access to the criminal process to quasi-
criminal cases such as parental termination appeals. It also vaguely limited
Washington v. Davis. The Court should build on M.L.B. and recognize a
fundamental rights exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement.
It is unlikely that, as Justice Thomas feared, M.L.B. will be applied to civil
cases such as custody battles and zoning fights. If the Court recognizes a
fundamental rights exception, it could use Griffin's right of access to remedy
the effects of wealth discrimination in quasi-criminal cases such as capital state
postconviction proceedings.
Griffin's right of access to the criminal process should be used to overrule
Giarratano on equal protection grounds and to provide counsel for indigent
death row inmates at state postconviction proceedings. The Court's ban on
successive federal habeas petitions makes it imperative that indigent death row
inmates get a meaningful first shot. The case of Exzavious Lee Gibson
demonstrates the importance of providing counsel at least one time through the
capital appellate process because of the fundamental right at stake. As Justice
Brennan said in Furman v. Georgia,268 capital inmates who are executed
have "'lost the rights to have rights,"' and dead prisoners are forever deprived
265. Id. at 1301. In Lonchar, the inmate contested the method of his execution, not his death sentence.
266. Id. at 1299.
267. Courts have refused to apply M.LB. to criminal cases involving transcript fees, much less the
right to counsel. See, e.g., Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (rejecting an
indigent inmate's request for a free transcript for his habeas petition because he was represented by private
counsel at trial, not the public defender's office); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to the filing fees provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1915 (West Supp. 1996)); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 1997) (same). But see
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that seeking reassignment from
administrative segregation is not a fundamental interest at stake under M.LB., as would exist in a parental
termination case, divorce decree, or challenge to the length of a sentence). The belief that a fundamental
interest is at stake in contesting the length of a sentence suggests that M.LB. might well apply to capital
sentences.
268. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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of the "right of access to the courts." 269 If the Court recognizes a
fundamental rights exception, it could operate the death penalty assembly line
while ensuring that fundamental equal protection rights are preserved.
269. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S. 86. 102 (1958) (plurality
opinion), quoted in Brief for Respondents at 28, Murray v. Giarratano. 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (No. 88-411)).
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